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ABSTRACT 
.' 
Socially responsible investing has been gaining substantial attention in recent decades with 
growing interest in corporate governance and employee-friendly firms. Among numerous 
published sources recognizing firms for social responsibility, Fortune magazine publishes an 
annual list of the "100 Best Companies to Work For." Friedman (1970) argues that management 
should focus solely on maximizing shareholder wealth, but numerous studies are finding 
abnormal market reactions to the publishing of focus lists spotlighting firms. This event study 
adds to a growing body of literature in the field of behavioral finance, observing investors' 
reaction to Fortune's "100 Best Companies" from 2000 to 2010. Analysis of results shows 
significant negative returns surrounding the event date, an anomaly to previous studies. 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
Socially responsible investing has been gaining substantial attention in recent decades, 
especially as employees' demands for higher compensation and better benefits have increased 
since the late-1990s. Some argue that the growing importance of human capital in the corporate 
world justifies the necessity for increased benefit programs. Others question the impact such 
programs have on bottom-line returns to shareholders. Waddock (2000), Waddock and Smith 
(2000), and others have documented the growing importance for a multiple-bottom-line approach 
to corporate practices, noting that investing in socially responsible firms often offers 
opportunities for increased cash flows. These studies document that an appropriate blend of 
socially responsible practices can positively impact internal corporate performance. However, 
this study observes how external stakeholders-specifically, investors-perceive and respond to 
information about "socially responsible" corporate practices. 
The growth of pension and mutual funds has led to stronger shareholder voices at annual 
meetings. Some of these funds-including the California Public Employees' Retirement 
System, or CaiPERS-have grown in their activist approach to corporate governance and social 
issues, even to the point of creating publicized focus lists of underperforming companies to 
shame them into better social and corporate practices, and thus higher returns for shareholders. 
Other companies have maintained a more positive approach by recognizing firms that are 
socially responsible andJor employee-friendly. Numerous annual focus lists such as Working 
Mother magazine'S list of the "100 Best Companies for Working Mothers," Mother Jones's "20 
Best Places to Work," and various Fortune magazine lists and surveys have been at the forefront 
of spotlighting companies that care for their employees. 
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A number of studies have observed the short-term and long-term market responses to 
such announcements and focus lists. Findings have varied substantially as to whether investors 
can obtain abnormal returns over the market or a matched sample of companies by investing in 
these socially responsible firms. This is where the field of behavioral finance enters the picture. 
Behavioral finance combines the fields of finance and psychology to observe the impact of the 
human mind and human behavior on asset pricing, investment purchase or divestment decisions, 
industry entry decisions, and countless other situations. One such branch of behavioral finance 
focuses on companies' pursuit of corporate visibility. According to the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), markets are semi-strong-form efficient, accurately reflecting all historic and 
current public information. Clayman (1987, 1994), Filbeck and Preece (2003a, 2003b), Filbeck 
(1997, 2001), Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2004), Urrutia and Vu (1999), and many others 
have raised questions as to whether the element of human behavior in the investment world can 
lead to inaccurate pricing of securities over the short or long term. Numerous financial experts 
have observed anomalies that seem to disprove the EMH. If anything, they at least draw the 
theory's exclusive statements into the open to expose prolonged market inefficiencies. 
The purpose of this study is to determine investors' immediate reaction to "visible" 
socially responsible firms. The primary focus is the list of companies Fortune magazine 
recognizes as the" 1 00 Best Companies to Work For" from 2000 to 2010. Do investors agree 
with socially responsible investment (SRI) principles which suggest that companies who care for 
employees will also offer higher returns to shareholders? Or do investors anticipate lower 
bottom lines as a result of higher costs for being socially responsible and providing employee 
benefits? How does increased corporate visibility impact investors' strategies? These central 
questions discussed in this study will be key issues of debate in the coming decades . The 
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implications of these findings could not only influence investment strategy but also whether 
corporate officers should even consider pursuing recognition (including acknowledgement for 
being an employee-friendly firm) . Findings thus far have shown that while positive and negative 
information has little impact on returns, a lack of visibility leads to decreased returns (Brammer 
et aI. , 2004). This implies that companies must pursue opportunities for visibility (including 
publicity through independent companies if recognition for current corporate practices is not 
already present) even if such visibility will not prove profitable for investors. 
The remainder of this study begins by providing a literature review of studies related to 
investor behavior, corporate visibility, and social responsibility followed by an overview of 
Fortune's "100 Best Companies to Work For." This is followed by the study'S hypothesis and 
an explanation of the data set and research methodology. The next section explains results and 
findings, and concluding thoughts are provided at the end. 
SECTION 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Section 2.1: Investor Behavior. Corporate Visibility. and Social Responsibility 
There is a growing body of research related to various aspects of behavioral finance. 
Some studies have focused more on the psychological element of investing, observing that many 
investors seem to neglect hard financial data and react to irrelevant information. Fisher Black in 
his article entitled "Noise" poses two different groups of investors: information traders and noise 
traders (1986) . Information traders are investors that hear a piece of information and 
appropriately respond by trading. Noise traders hear a piece of "noise"-thinking that it is true 
information-and inappropriately respond by trading. The development of noise trading theory 
is critical to the study of behavioral finance . Black argues the markets would not be efficient and 
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that asset prices across all asset classes would be completely predictable if it were not for noise 
traders. Information traders must always have an investor on the opposite side of the trade to 
make the transaction. If that second investor has the same information as the information trader, 
the transaction will not take place. Since it is often the result of the transaction (i.e. the ex post 
return on investment) that signals whether the data is information or noise, investors are always 
uncertain as to whether they are trading on valid or noisy information. Hong and Stein (1999) 
continued with Black's hypothesis that two different sets of investors exist: "newswatchers" and 
"momentum traders." They find that such a dichotomy leads to substantial over- and 
underreaction to news over longer event horizons. Black (1986) and Hong and Stein (1999) both 
set the background for this current study. 
Bikhchandani and Hirshleifer (1998) conducted a study to observe individuals'responses 
to signals and the actions of others. Their findings directly relate to investor behavior, 
explaining the phenomenon of herding on market information. Huberman (2001) observed that 
large percentages of regional telephone companies' shares are held by local or regional investors. 
These investors reject sound principles of risk management and diversification for familiarity. 
Investors also have inconsistent investment forecasts between surveys where companies' names 
are provided compared to surveys that only contain corporate characteristics, such as market 
capitalization (Statman, 2010). 
Other studies observe investor over- and underreaction to information. Barberis, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1998) attempted to create a model to capture these investment phenomena. They 
propose investors only trade in one of two regimes, moving between the two over periods of 
time. In the conservative regime, investors observe returns in period 1 and expect the opposite to 
occur in period 2. The alternative is a representativeness heuristic-or trending-regime in 
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which investors observe period 1 returns and expect the same to occur in period 2. Veronesi 
(1999) argues for a different definition of conservative investor behavior, one in which investors 
overreact to bad news in good times and underreact to good news in bad times. 
Even though investors may be aware of generally accepted financial principles such as 
portfolio diversification, many tend to neglect these concepts when making investment decisions, 
even to the point of influencing share prices and decreasing market efficiency. One such 
phenomenon discovered by Ball and Brown (1968) is post-earnings-announcement drift. The 
markets should theoretically follow a "random walk hypothesis" that supposes returns and 
market prices cannot be predicted. They should also fully and quickly reflect all earnings 
information per the efficient market hypothesis. Shleifer (2000) published a book entitled 
Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance that affirms issues with the efficient 
market hypothesis, thus opening doors to behavioral finance and these studies on post-earnings-
announcement drift. Ball and Brown (1968) discovered that markets continue to adjust for at 
least a year following an earnings announcement. Bernard and Seyhun (1990) and Bernard and 
Thomas (1989, 1990) further analyzed this anomaly to determine if asset pricing models (i.e. the 
capital asset pricing model, or CAPM-see Sharpe, 1963) were not accounting for risk factors 
that explain this post-earnings-announcement behavior. Bernard and Thomas (1990) confirmed 
the existence of autocorrelation, an underlying pattern of wave-like increases and decreases 
around a central value-in this case, stock prices about their intrinsic value. Aside from this, no 
additional risk factors were found in the study to explain prolonged investor reaction to 
information. These and other attempts to create technical models for investor behavior have 
often proved futile. 
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Investor behavior related to corporate visibility has become a growing topic of discussion 
in the financial community; findings have been quite varied. Barber and Odean (2008) find that 
because individual investors' attention as a resource is limited, they initially reduce the size of 
their equity screens by focusing on those companies receiving attention in the news or via some 
other form of visibility before screening for other financial characteristics. Market inefficiencies 
develop when large numbers of investors lack the time and resources to make well-informed 
investment decisions. Urrutia and Vu (1999) confirm the "overreaction hypothesis" that 
investors overreact and then subsequently retreat on both good and bad news. Their study also 
provides evidence for the firm advertising effect hypothesis that firms with increased visibility 
will see increased liquidity in trading following an announcement or publication referencing the 
company. 
Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first 
century, there has been heightened interest in socially responsible investing and recognizing 
companies for quality, employee-friendliness, and related upward investment potential. Much of 
this has come as a result of studies similar to Waddock and Smith (2000) which argue firms that 
stick to core corporate mission statements and goals and care for their employees also do well 
financially. Much of the interest and discussion came as rebuttal to an article by University of 
Chicago professor Milton Friedman published in the New York Times Magazine. In the article, 
Friedman makes a case that the sole focus of managers should be on maximizing shareholder 
wealth (Friedman, 1970). Any other goals create agency relationships between managers and 
other stakeholders and lead to decreased returns to investors. Even with such statements, books 
and periodicals frequently rate and rank companies based on social performance measures, 
leading to continued research on the shareholder benefits of socially responsible investors. 
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According to a book by Tom Peters and Bob Waterman entitled In Search for Excellence 
(1982), an excellent company is one that engages in continuous innovation, is large in size, and 
has great financial performance. Clayman (1987) and Kolodny, Laurence, and Ghosh (1989) 
examined whether the Peters and Waterman (1982) list of excellent companies could indeed 
produce higher returns for investors, initially finding they tend to "return to the mean." In other 
words, companies performing well saw decreased returns while poorly-performing companies 
realized gains. However, upon revisiting her study and increasing the size of her data set, 
Clayman (1994) fOWld contrasting results: "good" companies substantially outperformed "poor" 
companies. This was probably the result of a larger data set as well as different economic times. 
The economic climate of the 1980s looked very different than that of the early 1990s, differences 
that market-adjusted models may not completely eliminate. Prazasnyski and Tai (1999) found 
that firms receiving the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award (MBNQA) do not produce 
increase annualized shareholder wealth in excess of the market. Schadler and Eakins (2001) 
analyzed Merrill Lynch's weekly focus stocks that would presumably experience significant 
returns over the following 12 months. These companies realized positive abnormal returns on 
the first day of trading after the announcement but no abnormal returns over a one-year holding 
peri<?d. Filbeck (2001) observed inconclusive results when comparing companies Mother Jones 
magazine selected as the "20 Best Places to Work" to both the S&P 500 Index and a matched 
sample. Only 8 out of 12 and 6 out of 12 annual lists outperforming the market index and 
matched sample, respectively, over one-, five-, and twelve-year holding periods; there was only 
marginal statistical significance. Anginer and Statman (2010) found that admired companies 
based on the Fortune surveys performed poorly compared to spurned companies over a one-year 
holding period. 
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On the other hand, Filbeck (1997) and Antunovich and Laster (2003) studied Fortune's 
list of "America's Most Admired Companies" and found these companies did in fact provide 
abnormal returns to investors over various holding periods from 1983 to 1994 and 1983 to 1995, 
respectively. Lower-ranked firms would typically be expected to outperform higher-ranked 
firms since lower-ranked firms have more upward potential, even with their increased risk. Fund 
managers might prefer to hold these companies 1) to gain higher returns if these companies 
perform well or 2) to blame poor performance on the company rather than the manager. These 
findings present anomalies to previous studies. Michelson (1999) discusses mutual fund 
performance for funds listed in the Forbes Honor Roll over 1-, 3-, and 5-year periods relative to 
the market, finding that these funds produce significantly higher returns compared to the market 
over the 3- and 5-year periods. According to a study by Junkin and Toth (2009), companies that 
saw a 5-year holding period return (HPR) of 83.3% below respective benchmark companies 
(-30.1 % annually) prior to being listed in the CalPERS Focus List of underperforming companies 
saw a 5-year HPR of 12.7% above those benchmarks following publication (2.4% annually). 
Filbeck and Preece (2003a) and Edmans (forthcoming) looked at Fortune's "100 Best 
Companies to Work For" and found the "100 Best" outperformed a matched sample over 
multiple holding periods, although results varied in statistical significance. Thus, findings have 
been inconsistent, at least over long-term holding periods. 
The above literature observed various holding period returns, taking a more long-term 
approach to this body of research. Other analysis (similar to this study) has explored event 
studies, analyzing short-term market reactions surrounding publications of focus lists containing 
"good" or socially responsible companies. Again, results have been varied. Brammer, et al. 
(2004) observed companies listed in Management Today's Most Admired Firms and found 
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increased visibility-good or bad-had little impact on returns, and that only the absence of 
information led to decreased returns. Meschke (2004) followed returns of companies whose 
CEOs were interviewed on CNBC, finding these firms realized significant positive abnormal 
returns prior to and after the announcement, but cumulative negative returns for the ten days 
following the event. Preece and Filbeck (1999) found that investing in companies published in 
Working Mother magazine's annual survey of family-friendly firms does not necessarily mean 
one will earn higher returns than the market or a matched sample. A later study observed a 
negative market response to the Working Mother announcement, showing that firms' stock prices 
decrease around a 0- to 10-day event horizon surrounding the announcement date (Filbeck & 
Preece, 2003b). In addition to long-term holding period returns, Filbeck (2001) also looked at 
the market's reaction to a Wall Street Journal article citing the Mother Jones 1997 list-a 
slightly negative response showing relative indifference to the information. Filbeck and Preece 
(2003a) continued their study of Fortune's 1998 list of the "100 Best Companies" by observing 
changes in returns over a 30-day event window. They found the market initially reacts positively 
to the information based on their chosen event date. Fi1beck and Preece's work closely 
resembles this current study even though different event dates and windows were used and a 
smaller sample was taken. 
Section 2.2: Fortune's 100 Best Companies to Work For 
The data set used in this study is the list of the "100 Best Companies to Work For." The 
first list that observed was published in a book in 1984 and later revised in 1993. Fortune did 
not pick up publication until 1998 (Edmans, forthcoming). Robert Levering and Milt Moskowitz 
have written and performed the annual study and list since its beginnings in the 1980s. The 
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magazine has partnered with the Great Place to Work Institute to compile surveys and create the 
list. Fortune's process for compiling the list differs from other similar rankings. Working 
Mother's list of the "100 Best Companies for Working Mothers" only surveys industry experts 
and company executives, leaving room for over-optimizing performance and practices. Such 
was the case with Sprint, where employees reported substantial differences between management 
reports used in the Working Mother survey and actual corporate practices. The Fortune survey 
to that determines the "100 Best Companies" takes a much broader approach. Fortune does 
consider various compensation programs, family care opportunities, and other items recognized 
by the Working Mother survey, but Fortune surveys actual employees when compiling the list 
(Filbeck & Preece, 2003a). Therefore, the "100 Best Companies" is a much more reliable 
ranking of companies than other related surveys. 
The Great Places to Work Institute received employee survey responses from an average 
of over 350 companies from 2006 to 2011. According to the most recent selection criteria, about 
two-thirds of a company's score in determining list placement is based on the results of this 
Institute's Trust Index survey sent to employees. The Fortune list's authors state, "the survey 
asks questions related to their attitudes about management's credibility, job satisfaction, and 
camaraderie" (Levering & Moskowitz, 2011). The remaining third of the score is based on 
management's survey responses regarding "pay and benefit programs ... hiring practices, internal 
communication, training, recognition programs, and diversity efforts." To be eligible, companies 
must be at least seven years old and must have at least 1,000 U.S. employees. 
Fortune typically publishes the "100 Best Companies" list its January or February issue. 
Some sources report an earlier release of information, perhaps three weeks before the magazine 
date (Filbeck & Preece, 2003a) up to a week before the magazine date (Edmans, forthcoming), 
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but release dates are hard to pinpoint, as information could leak well in advance of the 
announcement. The selection of an event date for this study will be discussed in a later section. 
SECTION 3: HYPOTHESIS, DATA SET, AND METHODOLOGY 
Section 3.1: Hypothesis 
This study poses the following question: Does the market react to the publication of 
For/une magazine's list of the "100 Best Companies to Work For", and if so, does it react 
positively or negatively to the information? Investors are likely to respond negatively to this 
information, taking a pessimistic view toward socially responsible investing as they refuse to 
value intangibles such as human capital in corporate valuation models. While improved benefit 
programs might increase employee productivity leading to higher revenues, one should probably 
anticipate a lower bottom line and decreased returns to shareholders due to additional expenses 
incurred in implementing various employee benefit programs. Therefore, this study anticipates a 
negative response. Such results would uphold findings of Filbeck and Preece (2003b) but would 
be contrary to returns seen in Filbeck and Preece (2003a) and a relatively neutral response in 
Filbeck (2001). It is also probable that some level of information leakage will occur prior to the 
event date since Filbeck and Preece (2003a) and Edmans (forthcoming) cite evidence for list 
announcement prior to the magazine date. 
Section 3.2: Data Set and Methodology 
As mentioned before, this study analyzes For/une magazine'S annual list of the "100 Best 
Companies to Work For." The data set was created by compiling lists from 2000 through 2011 
and gathering CUSIP numbers for all possible companies. For the purpose of this study, each 
13 
time a company is listed is treated as a separate "security-event," and the study only observes 
publically traded companies. Out of the 1,200 companies/event occurrences, only 599 had 
CUSIP numbers available, and of those only 496 security-events had usable returns available on 
the CRSP Daily Combined Return File. Data was not yet available in the CRSP database for 
2011 returns, thus accounting for the sharp decline in usable security-events. Thus, the final data 
set only includes Fortune 's" 100 Best Companies" lists from 2000 through 2010, still providing 
a broad sample set to analyze. 
The study set the event date each year (t = 0) at the magazine date when the list was 
published. I The 2003 Fortune magazine date is January 20, 2003, which was Martin Luther 
King Day; the markets are closed on this holiday, so the event date for that year was moved to 
the next trading day on January 21, 2003 . The estimation period for parameter estimates lasted 
200 days and ended 46 days before the event-in other words, [-246, -46]- and the event 
window for estimated returns was [-30, 30]. Such an estimation period allows good estimates of 
a and fJ (discussed later) by drawing from a long sample but still narrow enough to avoid too 
much noise that could distort estimates. Table 1 lists each event date and the number of security-
events per year that meet the above criteria. 
The next section discusses each of the following sets of results: the first compares raw, 
unadjusted returns each day in the event window and for various segmented windows; the second 
set looks at market-adjusted returns; the third compares returns based on a basic market model; 
the fourth, a market model incorporating the Scholes-Williams estimate of fJ; and the fifth 
1 Filbeck and Preece (2003a) set an event date 3 weeks prior to the magazine date in which the" I 00 Best 
Companies" appeared in addition to studying a smaller event window: [-15, 15]. Filbeck and Preece 
(2003a) noted the difficulty of setting a specific event date, so this study creates a wider event window 
and study a larger pool of companies. This study used the date on the magazine publication as the event 
date and observed a much larger event window of[-30, 30]. 
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Table 1 
Fortune's" 1 00 Best Companies to Work For" Release Dates 
Event date (I = 0) Number of 
companies 
January 10, 2000 45 
January 8, 2001 45 
February 4, 2002 45 
January 21, 2003 53 
January 12, 2004 50 
January 24,2005 53 
January 23, 2006 45 
January 22, 2007 43 
February 4, 2008 41 
February 2, 2009 40 
February 8, 2010 36 
analyzing comparison-period mean-adjusted returns. The CRSP equally weighted market 
index-an index of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks-was the market index of choice 
for this study. 
The data was culled using Eventus, a statistical software package that "performs event 
studies using CRSP stock database or user-collected data" (2007). The software locates a 
designated list of companies, each set with a specific event date, and gathers and analyzes returns 
over various event windows-specifically those from the daily stock return file. Each model 
mentioned above and explained in the results section was created and analyzed through the 
Eventus software package. 
SECTION 4: RESULTS 
The results of the study were consistent with the hypothesis: investors respond 
negatively to the publication of Fortune's "100 Best Companies." Five separate sets of results 
were culled for measuring and comparing average and abnormal returns over the event window: 
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raw, unadjusted returns; market-adjusted returns ; a basic market model; the Scholes-Williams 
market model; and comparison-period mean-adjusted returns. The discussion below explores 
each model in tum. 
The first set of results compares raw, unadjusted returns each day in the event window 
and for various segmented windows: 
where Aj .t is the abnormal return on security j at time t, and 
Rj .t is the return on security j at time t. 
Table 2 provides returns over various event windows. 
Table 2 
Raw, unadjusted returns over various event windows -Fortune's "100 Best Companies to Work For" 
2000-2010 
Mean 
Precision 
Portfolio 
Days Cumulative Weighted Positive: Patell Z p-value Time- p-value Generalized p-value 
Abnormal Negative Series Sign Z 
Return CAAR (CDAl t 
(-30, -2) 0.28% 0.32% 253 :243 0.513 0 .3039 0.104 0.4587 0.691 0 .2448 
(-1,0) -1.31% -1.34% 158:338«< -8.079 <.0001 -1.828 0 .0338 -7 .841 <.0001 
(+1, +30) 1.87% 2.27% 275:221» 3.53 0 .0002 0 .674 0 .2502 2.667 0.0038 
(-15, +15) -0.48% 0 .13% 245:251 0.205 0.4189 -0 .17 0.4326 -0.027 0.4891 
(-5, +5) -0.27% -0.32% 236:260 -0 .834 0 .2022 -0 .161 0 .4361 -0.836 0 .2017 
(-30, +30) 0.84% 1.25% 257:239 1.367 0.0858 0.213 0.4156 1.05 0.1468 
Note. The symbols (,<,« ,«< or ),>,»,»> show the direction and generic one-tail significance of the 
generalized sign test at the 0.10,0.05,0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
The second set of results looks at market-adjusted returns: 
where Rm,/ is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted market index at time t. 
Event window returns are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Market-adjusted returns over various event windows - Fortune's " 1 00 Best Companies to Work For" 
2000-2010 
Mean Precision Portfolio 
16 
Days Cumulative Weighted Positive: Pate II Z p-value Time- p-value Generalized p-value Abnormal Negative Series Sign Z 
Return CAAR (COA) t 
(-30, -2) -3.40% -4.07% 165:331«< -7.353 <.0001 -2 .715 0.0033 -6.78 <.0001 
(-1, 0) -1.06% -1.16% 178:318«< -7.977 <.0001 -3 .22 0.0006 -5.612 <.0001 
(+1, +30) -1.11% -0.63% 240:256 -1.117 0.132 -0.872 0.1917 -0.042 0.4834 
(-15, +15) -3.52% -3 .68% 190:306«< -6.436 <.0001 -2.711 0.0034 -4.534 <.0001 
(-5,+5) -3 .76% -3.80% 165:331«< -11.159 <.0001 -4.866 <.0001 -6.78 <.0001 
{-3~, +30) -5 .58% -5.86% 185:311<<< -7.298 <.0001 -3.066 0.0011 -4.983 <.0001 
Note. See Table 2 for statistical significance symbols. 
The third set of results is obtained by creating a market model, first by regressing the 
following equation to obtain estimates of aj and Pj : 
where aj is the active return on investment, 
Pj is the beta of the security, a parameter measuring the sensitivity of Rj,t to the market 
index, and 
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Cj.t is the error term-a random variable that must have an expected value of 0 and is 
uncorrelated with Rm.t . 
Abnormal returns were then computed for the basic market model using the following equation: 
where a j and /lj are ordinary least squares estimates of aj and Pj . 
Table 4 provides event window returns. 
Table 4 
Basic market model abnormal returns over various event windows - Fortune's "J 00 Best Companies to 
Work For" 2000-2010 
Mean 
Precision 
Portfolio 
Days 
Cumulative 
Weighted Positive: Patell Z p-value Time- p-value Generalized p-value 
Abnormal CAAR Negative Series Sign Z 
Return (CDA) t 
(-30, -2) -5.28% -4.42% 152:344«< -10.044 <.0001 -4.779 <.0001 -7.83 <.0001 
(-1,0) -1.19% -1.05% 172 :324«< -9.1 <.0001 -4.091 <.0001 -6.033 <.0001 
(+1,+30) -2.40% -0.96% 251 :245 -2.157 0.0155 -2.134 0.0164 1.066 0.1431 
(-15, +15) -5.33% -4.03% 190:306«< -8.859 <.0001 -4.66 <.0001 -4.415 <.0001 
(-5, +5) -4.86% -3 .63% 143:353«< -13.394 <.0001 -7.141 <.0001 -8 .639 <.0001 
(-30, +30) -8.87% -6.44% 181 :315«< -10.086 <.0001 -5.533 <.0001 -5.224 <.0001 
Note. See Table 2 for statistical significance symbols . 
The fourth model incorporates Scholes and Williams' (1977) method of estimating p. In 
their model, estimated f3 is calculated by comparing security returns with and estimation of the 
market return based on a 3-day moving average of returns surrounding the event date. The 
Scholes-Williams f3 estimation also incorporates an estimation of the first-order autocorrelation 
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of the return on the market. The same equation used to compute abnormal returns for the basic 
market model is then used for this model. Table 5 gives returns over various event windows for 
the market model based on the Scholes-Williams j3 estimation. 
Table 5 
Scholes-Williams market model abnormal returns over various event windows - Fortune's" 1 00 Best 
C W k F "2000 20 10 ompantes to or or -
Mean 
Precision 
Portfolio 
Days 
Cumulative 
Weighted Positive: Patell Z p-value Time- p-value Generalized p-value 
Abnormal Negative Series Sign Z 
Return 
CAAR (COAl t 
(-30, -2) -4.81% -3 .99% 156:340<<< -8 .993 <.0001 -4.084 <.0001 -7.492 <.0001 
(-1,0) -1.23% -1.06% 166:330«< -9.125 <.0001 -3 .985 <.0001 -6.593 <.0001 
(+1, +30) -2.21% -0.96% 246:250 -2.126 0.0167 -1 .844 0.0326 0.595 0.2759 
(-15, +15) -4.89% -3.60% 195:301«< -7.838 <.0001 -4.014 <.0001 -3 .988 <.0001 
(-5, +5) -4.20% -3.10% 154:342«< -11.356 <.0001 -5.791 <.0001 -7.672 <.0001 
(-30, +30) -8.25% -6 .01% 190:306«< -9.344 <.0001 -4.831 <.0001 -4.437 <.0001 
Note. See Table 2 for statistical significance symbols. 
The last model examined comparison-period mean adjusted returns, where the arithmetic 
mean return (R j ) for each security is computed based on returns over the estimation period 
[-246, -46] . The following equation computes the abnormal returns for the data set: 
Table 6 shows returns over different event windows. 
Table 6 
Comparison-Period Mean Adjusted Returns over various event windows - Fortune's" I 00 Best 
Companies to Work For" 2000-2010 
Mean 
Precision 
Portfolio 
Cumulative 
Weighted Positive: Pate II Z p-value Time- p-value Generalized Days 
Abnormal Negative Series Sign Z CAAR 
Return (COA) t 
(-30, -2) -1.66% -2.01% 216 :280< -3 .193 0.0007 -0.608 0.2717 -2.208 
(-1,0) -1.44% -1.50% 144:352«< -9.052 <.0001 -2.015 0.022 -8.676 
(+1, +30) -0.14% -0.15% 247 :249 -0.239 0.4057 -0.05 0.4801 0.578 
(-15, +15) -2.55% -2.37% 201 :295«< -3 .627 0.0001 -0.906 0.1826 -3.555 
(-5, +5) -1.01% -1 .21% 207 :289« -3.116 0.0009 -0.599 0.2746 -3.016 
(-30, +30) -3.24% -3.67% 206:290<<< -4.008 <.0001 -0.819 0.2065 -3 .106 
Note. See Table 2 for statistical significance symbols. 
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p-value 
0.0136 
<.0001 
0.2818 
0.0002 
0.0013 
0.001 
As mentioned before, the results for the study were consistent with this study's 
hypothesis that the market would react negatively to the publication of Fortune ' s list of the "100 
Best Companies to Work For." While the raw, unadjusted returns were not significantly 
negative (aside from the period [-I, 0] that saw 338 out of the 496 companies have negative 
returns, significant at the 0.1 % level), all other models showed significantly negative returns in 
most event windows, including the full [-30, 30] window. In each of the four models (excluding 
raw, unadjusted returns), between 58% and 64% of companies realized negative abnormal 
returns, significant at the 0.1 % level. In the [-30, -2] window, which incorporates a portion of 
the Filbeck and Preece (2003a) study's event window, mean cumulative abnormal returns are 
-5.28%, -4.81 %, and -3.40% for the basic market model , the Scholes-Williams market model , 
and the market-adjusted returns model, respectively. This demonstrates a definitively negative 
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market response to the list's announcement. In all five models, over 64% of companies realized 
negative returns-at least 318 companies out of 496 studied-a clear negative anticipation the 
day before the magazine date. Abnormal returns over the last half of the study over the [1, 30] 
window were not as low as for other periods, but this could mean the market had adequately 
incorporated all information prior to the magazine date. 
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION 
All in all, the returns clearly accept the hypothesis that the market negatively reacts to the 
publishing of Fortune's "100 Best Companies." There are various explanations for such 
findings. If news of companies' placement on the list leaked prior to the event window and the 
market positively overreacted to the information, the window would only account for the 
correction in valuation following the initial overreaction. However, the clearest assumption 
based on these findings is that shareholders perceive employee-friendly firms to be detrimental 
to maximizing their wealth. It seems that investors assume funds directed toward employee 
benefit programs directly reduce the company's bottom line and ultimately decrease returns to 
shareholders. 
Further studies need to be conducted on other related corporate visibility studies before 
drawing definitive conclusions. However, this study presents a significant anomaly to the 
Filbeck and Preece (2003a) study demonstrating positive market reaction to the announcement 
and adds to a growing body of literature on corporate visibility and socially responsible 
investing. Variations of this study can also be performed to further analyze this particular data 
set. It might be appropriate to create a matched sample of companies or measure returns against 
another market index given the nature and characteristics of firms within the data set. Since an 
21 
exact event date is uncertain, it might be wise to increase the size of the event window to [-45, 
30] and analyze more subsets of the window to find a more specific event date and account for 
any additional information leakage that might occur. 
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